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ANTHROPOLOGY 
INCLUSIVE FITNESS AND THE PRACTICE OF POLYANDRY 
AMONG THE SKIDI PAWNEE 
Thomas E. McGinnis 
Nebraska State Historical Society 
1500 R Street 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68508 
The ethnohistorical record of the practice of polyandry among 
the Skidi Pawnee of the 19th century is examined from the perspective 
of the inclusive fitness model. The practice of temporary polyandry 
may have allowed males to maximize their inclusive fitness by insuring 
high paternity certainty. Younger brothers and nephews may have 
guarded the wives of older male relatives to prevent the wives from 
bearing children of unrelated males. 
t t t 
Temporary polyandry was practiced among the Skidi 
Pawnee of the 19th century. TIle "inclusive fitness" model 
(Hamilton, 1964a and 1964b) is a possible explanation for the 
practice and social structure of the polyandrous mating sys-
tem. Hamilton's notion of inclusive fitness is defined by Irons 
(I 979: 1 7) as "a measure of an individual's genetic representa-
tion in descending generations. It takes into account both an 
individual's own reproduction and that of relatives who share 
some of the individual's genes." An individual can make a 
genetic contribution to the next generation by investing in its 
own offspring or in the offspring of relatives. An investment is 
anything done to increase the offspring's chance of surviving 
(Trivers, 1974:249). Investment in a relative's offspring is 
referred to as an altruistic act. To be adaptive, the investment 
or cost (C) of an altruistic act must be less than the benefit 
(B) received as a result of that act. This can be expressed 
mathematically as (Bs - Cs) + r (Bk - Ck) > O. "Where Bs 
and Cs are the benefits and costs to self, Bk and Ck are the 
benefits and cost to the related individual, and r is the coef-
ficient of relatedness between the two individuals" (Irons, 
1979 :25). For a more complete discussion of Hamilton's 
inclusive fitness model, see West Eberhard (1975). 
Polyandry has been traditionally defined as the marriage 
of one woman to two or more men. In a critical review and 
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discussion of traditional theories of polyandry, Berte (1977) 
divided the anthropological discussions of polyandry into the 
following three basic types: 
1. Unilineal evolutionary schemes which tend to be pri-
marily descriptive and largely speculative, and which 
use polyandry as an element in their construction. 
2. Particularistic causal explanations that invoke factors, 
or a combination of factors, such as sex ratio biases, 
!ineality, ecological stress, economic constraints, etc., 
to explain the situational occurrence of polyandry. 
3. Structural explanations of polyandry that interpret 
the phenomenon as an inherent feature of the overall 
social organization of the society or family unit. 
An empirical test of the inclusive fitness model as it re-
lated to Tibetan fraternal polyandrous marriages was con-
ducted by Beall and Goldstein (1981). They concluded: 
... that Tibetan fraternal polyandry does not appear 
to enhance the (individual or inclusive) fitness of the 
individuals who practice it and in fact seems to entail 
significant reproductive sacrifice, i.e., can perpetuate 
mating systems that decrease the individual and inclu-
sive fitnesss of the individuals who practice it. 
~: 
This finding by Beall and Goldstein started a debate in 
the anthropological literature. Abernethy's (1981) review of 
Tibetan fraternal polyandry criticizes Beall and Goldstein for 
using the mean number of children born instead of the mean 
number of surviving children in their calculations. After sub-
stituting the mean number of surviving children, the advantage 
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of monogamously married males is not as great. Abernethy 
went on to state that group selection is the proper way to view 
Tibetan polyandry, not individual selection. 
In another review, Fernandez (1981) pointed out that in 
order to test the theory of kin selection data spanning several 
generations, instead of the one generation studied by Beall and 
Goldstein, would be required. Fernandez also pointed out that 
there are resource constraints on the size of the Tibetan popu-
lation studied, and that polyandrous marriages may help to 
maintain a low birth rate. 
In another review of Tibetan polyandry Weigel and Taylor 
(1982) stated that Beall and Goldstein used only population 
statistics in their study. To test the inclusive fitness model as 
it relates to polyandry, it is necessary also to have quantita-
tive data on factors affecting individual choice. Weigel and 
Taylor concluded that sociobiology may "prove to be a rela-
tively unusable theory for human behavior because it is diffi-
cult to test," but they rejected the notion that Beall and Gold-
stain have demonstrated that the theory is incorrect. 
In the most recent review of Beall and Goldstein's posi-
tion, Fleising (1982) addressed a problem with the inclusive 
fitness model. The problem centers on a reconciliation of two 
views of selection. One view is that selection favors the maxi-
mization of resource utilization, and the other view is that 
selection favors the optimization of reproductive fitness. 
Fleising contended that there must be a merger of aspects of 
optimal foraging theory and the inclusive fitness model. 
These arguments are presented so the reader may be aware 
of the controversy surrounding the use of the inclusive fitness 
model to explain human polyandry. It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to make another empirical test of this model. Within 
the limits of the data available it may be useful to apply the 
model to the polyandry practiced by the Skidi Pawnee. 
In the 19th century the Pawnee practiced village endo-
gamy (Dorsey, 1906:71; Lowie, 1935:90; Dorsey and Murie, 
1940: 7 5, 97). However, marriage did occur outside of the vil-
lage on rare occasions (Lowie, 1935:90). Chastity among 
women was very important before marriage (Dorsey, 1906:73; 
Dorsey and Murie, 1940:96-97) and fidelity after marriage 
was of equal importance. The only reason cited for divorce 
among the Pawnee was infidelity on the part of women 
(Dunbar, 1880:267; Grinnell, 1891 :279; Dorsey, 1906:73; 
Dorsey and Murie, 1940:101). 
The Pawnee practiced levirate marriage (Grinnell, 1891: 
279; Lesser, 1930:99; Dorsey and Murie, 1940:85) and sororal 
polygyny (Dorsey and Murie, 1940:84). The man indicated at 
the time of marriage to the oldest sister if he intended to 
marry her younger sisters as well (Lesser, 1930 :99). 
Pawnee kin relationships were very fluid and not at all 
rigidly structured (Welt fish , 1965). A form of temporary 
polyandry was sometimes entered into between brothers and 
between uncles and their nephews (sister's sons) as long as 
they were friends and would not become jealous (Dorsey and 
Murie, 1940:85). The polyandrous relationship lasted several 
years (Dorsey and Murie, 1940:85), from the time the younger 
brother or nephew reached puberty until the time of his mar-
riage to another woman. The younger brother or nephew upon 
reaching puberty moved into the household of his older 
brother or maternal uncle. Some Pawnee say that the older 
brother would allow his younger brother to have sexual rela-
tions with his wife after he had demonstrated his bravery and 
prowess on the warpath (Lesser, 1930:99). From the perspec-
tive of the male, it would appear that any polyandrous rela-
tionship constitutes an altruistic act, i.e., benefiting another 
male's Darwinian fitness and decreasing his own fitness. 
However, when looked at from the perspective of the inclusive 
fitness model, under favorable circumstances, the very act 
may improve his inclusive fitness. The Pawnee man (older 
brother or maternal uncle) may in fact be improving his inclu-
sive fitness even though he may be lowering his Darwinian. 
fitness. In order for Pawnee polyandry to be adaptive (i.e., 
non-altruistic, and maximizing the inclusive fitness of the older 
male), the formula (Bs - Cs) + r (Bk - Ck) > 0 (Irons, 1979: 
25) must apply. In this application, Bs equals the benefit that 
the older male receives in terms of inclusive fitness, i.e., pass-
ing genes to the next generation. Cs equals the cost to the 
older brother or uncle in terms of Darwinian fitness. The cost 
to the older male in this relationship is allowing his wife's 
reproductive capacity to be utilized by his younger male 
relative. 
A Pawnee woman, on the average, had four children. No 
birth control was practiced and the reason for the small 
number of children was long lactation periods (Dunbar, 1880: 
266-267). 
According to Weltfish (1965), paternity determination 
was biologically calculated by the Pawnee, and children with 
unknown biological fathers were social outcasts. In the follow-
ing passage, Weltfish (1965:17-18) related how the biological 
determination was accomplished: 
... The Pawnee were very literal about fatherhood. 
For a child to be accepted in the community with 
any decent status, its physiological father must be 
known. In any given month from one menstrual 
period to the next, a woman had to confine her 
sexual activities to one man only, and when she was 
aware through the cessation of menstruation that she 
had conceived, she was required to notify the man 
and point out on what occasion of intercourse to-
gether the child was conceived. The man was then 
obligated, until the child reached full maturity of 
eighteen or more, to provide it with fresh meat in 
whatever household it might be residing and in other 
ways to be concerned with its wellbeing. A woman 
who departed from this iron-clad rule was unable to 
convince a man of his paternity, and her child would 
then be a social outcast. ... 
This passage demonstrates that certainty of paternity 
was high among the Pawnee. The older male in the poly-
androus relationship would know which children were his and 
which were fathered by the brother or nephew. 
The number of children a younger brother or nephew 
might have had by an older brother's or maternal uncle's 
wife is unclear. However, the following passage from Weltfish 
(1965 :40) indicates that older brothers did not take responsi-
bility for a child fathered by a younger brother: 
... The chief (Leading Chief) believed that the baby 
was not his own but that of his younger brother, and 
when it was born he took the infant by the legs and 
was about to dash its head against a tree, when 
Victory Call rescued the baby .... 
It would be fair to say that the cost in terms of Dar-
winian fitness to a man could be substantial if a brother 
or nephew had a child by one of his wives, since a woman 
might have been expected to have only four children in 
her lifetime. However, because the biological father was 
responsible for providing protein to his child for at least 18 
years, the investment of the older male in the children of his 
wife or wives that were fathered by younger brothers or 
nephews would be reduced. Because the Pawnee were matri-
local (Fletcher, 1907:215; Lesser, 1979:263), all of these 
children probably resided in the household of the older male. 
It could be assumed that the older male probably made an 
investment in the children because of their close proximity. 
However, the iron-clad paternity determination probably 
resulted in his investment not being as great as in the children 
he had fathered. 
Under the polyandrous relationship, all of the older 
brother's or maternal uncle's wife's children would be related 
to the older brother. If he fathered one of his wife's children, 
he would be related to that child by 1/2 genetically. If one of 
his wife's children was fathered by a full brother, that child 
would be related to the older brother by 1/4. If a half brother 
fathered one of his wife's children, it would be related to the 
older brother by 1/8. Children fathered by the son of a full 
sister would be related to the maternal uncle by 1/8, and 
those fathered by the son of a half sister would be related to 
the maternal uncle by 1/16. The offspring of an older broth-
er's wife would always be related to the husband by 1/2 (if he 
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was their father) to 1/16 (if they were fathered by the son of 
a half sister. 
There was a possible advantage to the older male in the 
polyandry practiced by the Pawnee. From early childhood, a 
younger brother was taught to think of his older brother's 
wife as his wife (Lesser, 1930:99 and 1979:265). Whenever 
his older brother was away from the village for an extended 
period, the younger brother was sent by his parents to care for 
his older brother's wife. In this pattern of behavior, the young-
er brother may have served as a guard against other males 
outside of the polyandrous relationship inseminating an older 
brother's wife. According to Lesser (1981, personal communi-
cation), this was never expressed as a reason for the behavior 
by the Pawnee. Whether or not the Pawnee consciously 
thought of it as a reason makes little difference because it still 
could have fulfilled the function of insuring that males unre-
lated to the brothers did not have sexual access to the wife. 
As mentioned previously, Pawnee men were very guarded 
about access to their wives. Sexual promiscuity in wives was a 
very serious matter and a Pawnee woman could be killed for 
such a transgression (Grinnell, 1891 :279). 
It is now possible to write in some qualitative values to 
the formula (Bs - Cs) + r (Bk - Ck) > O. Bs equals the benefits 
to the older male. Bs equals guardianship of this wife while 
he is away from the village to insure paternity certainty. Cs 
equals the cost to the older male. Cs equals the possibility of 
his wife having a child by the younger male. The coefficient of 
relatedness is r and equals 1/2 (for a full brother) to 1/8 (for 
the son of a half sister). Bk equals the benefit to the younger 
male. Bk equals the possibility of fathering a child by the 
older male's wife. Ck equals the cost to the younger male. 
Ck equals providing meat to the child he may have fathered. 
So the formula would read: (paternity certainty - wife have a 
child by the younger male) + 1/2 to 1/8 (fathering a child -
providing meat to the child) > O. 
Unfortunately it is not possible to quantify the values to 
solve the equation. 
CONCLUSION 
An inclusive fitness model is offered as a possible explan-
ation of the practice of temporary polyandry among the 
Pawnee. 
For the practice of polyandry to be ;tdaptive for the older 
brother or uncle, he would have to be absent for long periods. 
In this way, he would receive the benefits of the younger 
brother's or nephew's guardianship of his wife. The model, 
then, predicts long periods of absence on the part of the 
males. 
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There is evidence for prolonged absence on the part of 
males, and this supports the model presented here. Champe 
and Fenenga (1974:101,103) stated that the Pawnee were in 
"a continuous state of armed aggression .... " The men were 
involved in frequent raiding and war expeditions. Murie (1981: 
156) stated that one war party traveled for many months 
before finding a village which they attacked. 
An empirical test of the inclusive fitness model is not 
possible in this case due to the limitations of the data set from 
the ethnohistorical literature. In order to test the inclusive 
fitness model empirically, one would need to know the fre-
quency of polyandrous marriage, the number of children the 
younger males fathered from the older male's wives, the set-up 
and dissolution procedures of polyandrous marriage, and the 
extent to which socio-economic factors influenced the practice 
of polyandry. It would also be useful to know how many 
wives the older male had before he entered into a polyandrous 
marriage, and if the polyandrous marriage was extended to all 
of his wives or just to one wife. Demographic information 
about the Pawnee would also be necessary for an empirical 
test of the inclusive fitness model. 
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